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Abstract—This note is the complement of the article ”Residen-
tial Energy Communities: How to minimize the investment risk from
an investor perspective”. The objective of this note is to explain
the methodology and rationals used in the mentioned article to
determine the prior-knowledge of the investor.
Index Terms—Bayesian Game, Distribution System Operator,
Grid tariffs, Residential Energy Community
I. INTRODUCTION
We will describe how the investor could infer the following
information:
• the repartition of consumer’s types in the neighborhood,
although it is not known with specific customer belongs
to each type θx
• for the type θi, the distribution of the values of βx,θi
• for the type θg , the distribution of the values of factor ξx
that intervenes in the determination of βx,θg .
Our example will be based on the Belgian situation, though
we will explain our approach in order that investors active in
other countries may find their way.
To do so, we have to estimate the proportion of each
consumer’s type and their respective /beta as well. We will
start with θi (consumer type not concerned by their electricity
bill (inelastic)) and secondly the proportion of the θg consumer
types (green oriented) and finally θc.
II. ANALYSES OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE RETAIL
MARKET REGARDING ENERGY PRICE
At the end of the 20th century, European Union and other
part of the world (e.g. New Zealand, Australia, etc.) switched
from a centrally-run-system of providers of generation, trans-
mission, distribution, and retailing to competitive markets.
This market can be seen as a functional split between the dif-
ferent here-above mentioned roles with new roles been added:
Regulation, administration, and market clearing. Transmission
and Distribution System Operator (TSO and DSO) considered
as natural monopolies are controlled by regulation agencies
that are independent from market and from government.
On the wholesale market, generators can make offers to
supply electricity at grid injection points, while retailers and
some major industrial users make bids to withdraw (”off-take”)
electricity at grid exit points. The market uses a locational
Fig. 1. HHI for the household market in electricity for selected countries.
marginal pricing auction which takes generators’ offers and
retailers’ bids and computes final prices and quantities at each
node.
Retailers (also named energy suppliers) purchase electricity
from this wholesale market, and on-sell it to final consumers.
Final consumers are free to change their retailer (action called
Supplier switch) and have the option of choosing a (dynamic)
electricity supply price contract.
One can argue that the proportions between the different
types of consumers are directly influenced by the maturity of
the competition in the energy market. At the extreme, in a
monopolistic framework, the sole provider does not have an
interest in offering highly differentiated offers and therefore
consumers are pushed to be broadly of the type θi.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) ([10]) is used by
regulatory agencies as an indicator of the amount of compe-
tition among electricity suppliers. An HHI index equal to 10
000 is corresponding to a monopoly market and the lower the
index, the fiercer the competition.
Figure 1 shows the HHI index for some regions in Europe
after more than ten years of liberalized retail market [9].
Another useful indicator measures the rate of supplier
switches. In Belgium, following [14] where the HHI index is
low, the rate of supplier switches is also high with 20.1% in
Flanders / 16.5% in Wallonia per year (12.2% at federal level
to be compared to 6.2% at European union level / Germany
9.6% / France 5.4%). One can think that these Belgian markets
are very highly competitive.
Though, the Belgian federal regulatory agency (CREG)
published in its market comparison an index called sleeping
contracts. These are old contracts signed for several years
and which kept the price level of gas and electricity of the
time. In December 2018, for a 3500 kWh consumer type,
the yearly cost of these contracts was 882 AC to be compared
to the cheapest offer at 631 AC [11]. This difference is, in
fact, huge because the commodity (energy) is only a part of
the total bill (between 25% to 30%). The share of taxes and
levies is the most significant part of households electricity
price (36% at European level / 33.9% at Belgian level/41.7%
for Wallonia). Then follows the DSO cost (26.3%) and TSO
cost (0.5%) (see [12] and https://www.ores.be/particuliers-et-
professionnels/facture).
These numbers indicate that, even in this very high compet-
itive markets, there is a significant percentage of customer for
which electricity bills is not a concern and that they are not
interested in this market. Following the CREG, it is 18% of
the customers who have never changed from supplier [11]. To
these consumers, we have to add those with a social contract,
i.e. consumers that have been dropped by their suppliers
because they have difficulties to pay their energy bills. It is
not a matter of choice but, for the purpose of this paper, they
cannot take any actions to join the community. their proportion
is around 2.5% (numbers from the same sources).
III. ASSESSMENT OF THE θi CONSUMERS AND THE
DISTRIBUTION OF βx,θi
From these data, we can assess that the proportion of θi
consumers is 20.5%. For the distribution of β in the space I
, we will assume that it is a normal distribution with 250 AC
as the mean (i.e. the difference between the costs of ”sleeping
contact” and cheapest contract) and zero is equal to three time
the standard deviation.
IV. ANALYSES OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE RETAIL
MARKET REGARDING ”GREEN APPETITE”
Another interesting aspect of the retail market is to look
at the products and contract types proposed to customers.
Beside the duration of the contracts, suppliers are offering
special green energy contracts with electricity mostly gen-
erated from renewable sources (or compensated by a green
label Guarantee of Origin following Directives 2001/77/CE,
2003/54/CE, 2004/8/CE, and 2009/28/EC). Table I shows the
prices of this product compared to the cheapest product for
some countries/region based on [8] and for Australia use of
https://www.energymadeeasy.gov.au/, for 3500 kWh consumer
without PV and any discount)
The aim of this table is not to compare prices between
countries because the price structure is not the same (Belgium
and Netherlands only commodity price, for other countries
some DSO components already included). Nevertheless, it can
be observed that, generally speaking, green products are more
expensive than a classical product. That indicates there are
customers, concerned by environmental issues, ready to pay
more in order to use renewable energy. We can use these
TABLE I
ILLUSTRATION OF THE green appetite (IN AC).
Country Green product Cheapest product
Belgium 284.50 223.85
France 527.25 479.70
Germany (Bayernwerk Netz) 1005.10 877.99
Netherlands 225.15 224.15
Australia (Sydney) 1420.00 1390.00
TABLE II
PROPORTION OF green appetite
Supplier Green Score Market share % of G
Engie 6/20 41.61% 12.5%
Luminus 2/20 17.66% 1.8%
Eneco 16/20 14.91% 11.9%
Lampiris 7/20 8.81% 3.1%
Essent 5/20 6.70% 1.7%
DSO 0/20 2.89% 0.0%
Elegant 7/20 2.52% 0.9%
Octa+ 8/20 1.43% 0.6%
Mega 17/20 0.69% 0.6%
Others 18/20 2.68% 2.4%
Total 35.4%
numbers to approximate the ξx < 0 in the relation ?? by
considering that ξx is a normal distribution with a mean equal
to 0.017 AC/kWh (i.e the difference between cheapest price
and green contract for Belgium divided by 3500 kWh) and
zero is equal to three time the standard deviation.
Regarding the proportion of consumer in the space θg it is
not possible to have a clear numbers of green contract as these
data are confidential. Anyway, we can use some sources to
approach this. On one hand, in Belgium, Greenpeace published
a scoring (on 20) for every supplier [15]. This score give how
green is the supplier beyond the commercial announcement.
On the other hand, the federal regulator published the share
of the residential market for each supplier [16]. To infer
the proportion of consumer type θg , we multiply these two
numbers. The rational behind this approach is that consumer
who really care about environment could consider such scoring
mechanism done by a (for them) trusted third party. The data
are shown on table II.
Complementary, the proportion of θc is equal to 44.1%(i.e
100%-20.5%-35.4%).
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